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ESSAY
"Does the allocation of power between the federal
and state governments and among the branches of
the federal government contribute to the preservation
of individual liberty and the functioning of our
government?"*
Implicit within the question presented are several queries which
must be answered in order to reply. First of all, we speak of the
allocation of power without knowing where the power originates. If
it comes from the federal government, it seems inconceivable that
the government of the Union should surrender part of its authority
to the states. We must also understand what allocation of power has
taken place, that is, which government and its various branches
possesses what responsibilities and limitations. Finally, we must see
the effects allocations of power have on the functions of the govern-
ments as well as on the liberties of the governed.
Presently, on one of the major television networks there is a
nightly series of historical anecdotes entitled "We the People. . ....
It popularizes the first three words of the preamble of the United
States Constitution by telling biographical summaries about individ-
uals, past and present, who have added considerably to the richness
of our American heritage. The phrase "We the People" has a
singularly awesome sound when it is understood within the context
of the Constitution. It means that the power of the government
belongs to the people, the governed, and is delegated to the govern-
ment "to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our pos-
terity." It is necessary to acknowledge that the power flows from
the people before a discussion can be made of the allocations
involved.
* Printed with the permission of the Commission on the Bicentennial of the
United States Constitution. This essay was a regional winner of the competition
held by the Commission and West Publishing.
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Political theorists during the Revolutionary era were well versed in
the philosophies of Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, John Locke, and
Charles de Montesquieu. But it was Locke's theory of social contract
which provided the basis for the Declaration of Independence. Lock-
ean theory proposes that men leave the state of nature and form a
civil society to secure their rights.1 Locke defined political power as
"that power which every man having in the state of nature has given
up into the hands of society" with the implied or explicit trust that
such power be used "for their good and the preservation of their
property." ' 2 In this manner, government is seen as "a device by which
individual men can protect their own life, liberty and property;" '3
and it is the "civil law, which must permit flexible and continuing
development as society changes, [that] primarily governs relationships
between individuals."
4
The notion that the ultimate authority resides in the people alone5
was at the heart of the Declaration of Independence. Indeed, the
alleged absolute monarchy from which the colonies declared inde-
pendence was inconsistent with civil society; for it is the purpose of
civil society to "avoid and remedy" the inconveniences of man being
the judge in his own case which exists in the state of nature, or
results from the dominion of an absolute prince. 6 With authority
vested in the people, government becomes a "public thing" - res
publica or republic - which is conducted for the interest and benefit
of the people, rather than the ruler.
7
During the Revolutionary era state governments were able to
produce a stabilizing force, in contrast to the disruption caused by
the struggle for independence, by adopting state constitutionsA Many
state constitutions contained a declaration of rights, or bill of rights,
which limited the power of the state government to infringe upon
the natural rights of the citizens. 9 After independence and peace were
1. David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist, 108 (1984).
2. John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, 97 (Thomas P. Peardon
ed. 1952).
3. Epstein, supra note 1 at 3.
4. Western Pa. Socialist Workers v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.,
-- Pa.__, 515 A.2d 1331, 1336 (1986).
5. Madison, THE FEDERALIST, No. 46, 315 (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961)
[hereinafter all citations to THE FEDERALIST are to this edition].
6. Locke, supra note 2 at 50-51.
7. Alfred H. Kelly, Winfred A. Harbison & Herman BeIz, The American
Constitution, 69 (6th ed. 1983).
8. Id.
9. Western Pa. Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d at 1334.
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won it soon became apparent that the loose confederation of states
would possess insufficient stability to maintain the status. Proponents
for a new government of the Union argued, "[m]en want the blessing
of living under stable laws on which they can depend; and this
blessing partly depends on the energy by which a good government
can defeat dangers to stability."' 1 The convention held at the Phil-
adelphia State House, May through September, 1787, was originally
thought to be for the purpose of strengthening the Articles of
Confederation which had been penned by the Second Continental
Congress." However, men such as James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton saw the necessity of building a new government, of writing
a new constitution, predicated on the belief that "the people. . .can
claim a right to rule." ''
2
Acknowledging that the authority of government is inherently in
the people is the first step to understanding the allocation of powers.
James Madison explained the second step in The Federalist when he
wrote: "In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and
then the portion allotted to each, subdivided among distinct and
separate departments.' ' 3 For, as we can see, the state and federal
governments are "but different agents and trustees of the people"
delegated different powers to be used for designated purposes. 4 Since
the base of both governments is the people, "[tihe government of
the Union, like that of each state, must be 'able to address itself
immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals.. .. ,5 Both
Madison and Hamilton recognized that one of the weaknesses of the
Confederation was that the central government only had power over
the states or "collective bodies." 16 This resulted in the "wheels of
the national government. . . [coming] to an awful stand" because
the thirteen sovereign wills refused to execute the measures of the
Union. 17 A government can only expect compliance with its laws if
10. Epstein, supra note 1 at 114.
11. See generally James Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention, 29-51
(E.H. Scott ed. 1970). [hereinafter cited as Journal.]
12. Epstein, supra note 1 at 153.
13. Madison, THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, at 351.
14. Madison, THE FEDERALIST, No. 46, at 315.
15. Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST, No. 16 at 102-103. (emphasis added.) Noah
Webster expressed the same sentiments in the winter of 1784-1785. Madison, Journal,
supra note 11 at 44.
16. See generally THE FEDERALIST, No. 15 at 89-98 and No. 45 at 308-14.
17. Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST, No. 15 at 98. See also Madison, Journal,
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it has the power to compel obedience, that is, if its laws are viewed
as more than mere advice. 18 The two forms of compulsion are
generally seen as the sword and the milder coercion of the executive.' 9
The sword works best against collective bodies, as was seen in the
Civil War; but the mild influence of the executive is aimed at the
individual since there is no expectation of a real struggle once the
executive "manifests its majesty.' '20
Once it is recognized that the powers of the state and federal
governments flow from the people, the next consideration fequires a
look at the powers delegated to the distinct governments. It is
generally understood that the federal government is supreme in
matters of foreign affairs. 2' This is evident: from the prohibition in
article I, section 10 on states entering into any treaty, alliance, or
confederation; from the guarantee in article IV, section 4 that the
United States shall protect each state from invasion; and from the
language of article II, section 2 paragraph 2, granting the executive
the power to make treaties with approval of two-thirds of the national
senate. The federal government also regulates commerce between and
among the several states and foreign nations," provides for the
general welfare,2 restrains states from certain injurious acts, 24 and
possesses that power which is necessary and proper to carry out its
functions. 2 Hamilton proposed the novel concept that the government
supra note 11 at 47. "As a natural consequence of this distracted and disheartening
condition of the Union, the Federal authority had ceased to be respected abroad,
and dispositions were shown there, particularly in Great Britain, to take advantage
of its imbecility, and to speculate on its approaching downfall." Id.
18. Epstein, supra note 1 at 38.
19. Id. [Author's note: Hamilton referred to the office as that of "magistrate"
but described it as the "proper executor of the laws" meaning what we today
acknowledge as the executive branch.]
20. Id.
21. United States v. Curtiss Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (The
Union, declared by the Articles of Confederation to be perpetual, was the sole
possessor of external sovereignty).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1
(1824) and Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (The
relative inquiry is to whether the activity to be regulated is commerce involving
more than one state and having a genuine and substantial relation to the national
interest).
23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (It is for Congress to determine which
expenditures are necessary for the public welfare).
24. THE FEDERALIST, No. 41, 269. See U. S. CONST. amend XIV.
25. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) construing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8. Madison concurred: "whenever a general power to do a thing
is given, every particular power necessary for doing it is included." THE FEDER-
ALIST, No. 44 at 304-305.
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of the Union is a limited government in that it possesses the powers
specifically enumerated, yet argued that "[t]hese powers ought to
exist without limitation: Because it is impossible to foresee or define
the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent
extent & variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy
them." 26 Hence, there exist broad implied powers within the "nec-
essary and proper" clause.
Although it would appear there remains little for the states to do,
Madison explained that the "powers reserved to the several states
will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state.''27 It was
left to the states to govern "the violations of rights and breaches of
duties between individuals" through the existence of civil law, both
common and statutory. 28 Thus, we see the states retaining the purpose
for which men originally created the body politic: the protection of
"their lives, liberties, and estates. '"29
The second part of Madison's description of the allocation of
power between state and federal governments is the apportionment
of each into distinct and separate departments. This allocation has
come to be known as the concept of separation of powers.A0 For, as
Madison warned, "[t]he accumulation of all powers legislative, ex-
ecutive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a few or
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."'" Use of the concept
of the separation of powers makes the laws applicable to the law-
makers. Each legislative grant of power to the executive is permission
to act in a prescribed way. If the executive can only use the power
given to him, and the legislature can grant power but cannot use it
26. Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST, No. 23 at 147. (Italic in original).
27. Madison, THE FEDERALIST, No. 45, at 313.
28. Western Pa. Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d at 1336.
29. Locke, supra note 2 at 71. Madison regarded the creation of political society
for the purpose of protecting men's "faculties." A man's faculty included his talents
and labor by which he was able to acquire property. Epstein, supra note 1 at 74.
Locke understood propefty to mean "property which men have in their persons as
well as goods." Locke, supra note 2 at 99.
30. Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chada, -U.S.-, 103 S. Ct.
2764, 2781 (1983) (Section 244(c) of the Immigration & Naturalization Act which
authorizes one House of Congress to pass a resolution invalidating a decision of an
agency of the executive branch is unconstitutional).
31. Madison, THE FEDERALIST, No. 47, at 324.
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itself, the citizens have little need to fear the government, 2 since it
would not be possible - as it would in the hands of an absolute
monarch - to have the power to enact tyrannical laws and to execute
such laws in the same hand.3 3 This is not to say that the actions of
the branches cannot result in an overlap of powers. For example,
the Senate acts as a judiciary when it impeaches, and the judiciary
"makes law" when it decides cases or controversies. What must be
avoided is "the whole power of one department [being] exercised by
the same hands which possess the whole power of another depart-
ment" or the "fundamental principles of a free constitution" will
be subverted.
3 4
Once governments are divided into separate branches it is necessary
to avoid the gradual concentration of power into one department by
giving each the constitutional means to resist the encroachments of
others.35 "Ambition must be made to counteract ambition; [t]he
interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights
of the place.' '36 Such a check and balance system is necessary when
a government is administered by men over men because a society
must first enable a government to control the governed, then oblige
it to control itself.
37
So far the discussion has centered on how the structure of the
federal and state governments prevent abuse of political liberties.
The next query is into the effect of the allocation of powers on
individual or civil liberties. Recall that Locke proposed all men are
free, equal and independent in the state of nature, 38 and it was to
avoid the inconvenience of each man enforcing the laws of nature
32. Epstein, supra note I at 129-30.
33. Madison, THE FEDERALIST, No. 47, at 326-27. Madison surveyed the
State constitutions and found very similar allocations of power, often with more
stringent prohibitions. For example, the Massachusetts atricles of liberty declare
"that the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers,
or either of them. . .. " Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 325-26 (emphasis in original).
35. Madison, THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, at 349. See INS v. Chada, 103 S.
Ct. 2764 (1983), wherein the INS joined Chada in arguing the contested section was
unconstitutional. See also Bowsher v. Synar, -U.S.-, 92 L. Ed.2d 583 (1986).
36. Madison, THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, at 349. [Author's note: No doubt,
Chief Justice John Marshall's initiative in the enunciation of the doctrine of judicial
review in Marbury v. Madison was precisely what Madison had in mind.]
37. Madison, THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, at 349.
38. Locke, supra note 2 at 4-5. Thomas Jefferson borrowed this concept for
the Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident that all
men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator wih certain inalienable
rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
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which resulted in men forming a political society and surrendering
the right to be governed to the body politic. 39 Yet the individual
liberties men possessed in nature were never surrendered. They remain
inherent in men to be preserved by the governments of the Union
and the states. 40 Juxtaposed with the natural rights inherent in man
is the idea of a fundamental law, a law of the land, "to which all
official and governmental action was bound to conform. . . [which]
could be invoked against officials by anyone aggrieved." 4' American
constitutional guarantees of liberty "are precepts of the law of the
land," and "violations of these secured liberties. . .involve defiance
of fundamental law." 42 As Justice T. C. Clark once warned: "[n]othing
can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe
its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own
existence."
43
Along with the allocations of power to the federal and state
governments are prohibitions on the use of the power granted which
are contained in the federal Bill of Rights and the state constitutions.
Initially, a few of the Federalists opposed the Bill of Rights as
redundant, since, as a government of delegated powers, the Union
was already limited as to what it could do. 44 However, Madison
considered it politically vital to draft the bill and avoid the Consti-
tution's opponents assembling another convention and undoing what
had been accomplished. 45 Originally, the draft prepared by Madison
and the House of Representatives would have restricted both the
federal and state governments.4 States' rights advocates in the Senate
succeeded in altering the amendments to apply to the federal gov-
ernment only.47 It was not until the passage of the fourteenth amend-
ment that many of the prohibitions on governmental action were
found to apply to the states. It was, at best, a gradual restriction.
39. Locke, supra note 2 at 50-51.
40. Western Pa. Socialist Workers, 515 A.2d at 1335.
41. Roscoe Pound, The Development of Constitutional Guarantees of Liberty,
61 (1957). Pound compares the Continental legal tradition based on the Justinian
codification system which believed law proceeded from the ruler, with the English
system which believed the ruler and ruled alike were subject to a fundamental law
of the land, which was ascertained rather than made. Id. at 9-11.
42. Id. at v.
43. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). ("All evidence obtained by searches
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is. . .inadmissible in a state court.")
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However, by 1969, nineteen of the twenty-six provisions in the Bill
of Rights were incorporated into the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
48
The guarantees of liberty applicable to the federal and state au-
thority not only protect the individual from unwarranted govern-
mental intervention, but can likewise protect the minority from the
impulse of the majority. Federalist theory recognizes that the "ma-
jority has no right to sacrifice other men's rights to their interests.
'49
Madison wrote extensively on this problem. 0 "Among the numerous
advantages promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to
be more accurately developed that its tendency to break and control
the violence of faction."' 51 By faction, Madison meant "a number of
citizens. . . united. . .by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent
and aggregate interests of the community. '52 The republican form
of government best controls the effects of faction since the great and
aggregate interests are referred to the national government and the
local and particular are referred to the state.5 3 It follows then that
prohibitions on either state or federal actions protect the minority
from actions of the majority who would use the governmental power
for their advantage to the detriment of the minority.
The allocation of power between the federal and state governments
and among the branches of the federal government contribute to the
preservation of individual liberty and the functioning of government
by providing a republican form of government predicated on the
notion of popular rule through representation. Representation permits
the voices of the local and the aggregate to be heard and provides
for the recognition of the concerns of both majority and minority.
Thus, the structure of the government provides the greatest protection
of political liberties. The limitations and prohibitions on the actions
of the government protect the citizens from unwarranted intrusions
into their private lives as the government carries out its functions of
48. Kelly, supra note 7 at 648.
49. Epstein, supra note 1 at 86.
50. See generally Madison, THE FEDERALIST, No. 10, at 56-65.
51. Id. at 56.
52. Id. at 57.
53. Id. at 63.
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protecting civil society from transgressions of its laws and the pun-
ishment of transgressors. This is, in fact, the reason for which men
entered into civil society.
A.M. Gulas

